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NOTE
Proposing a One-Year Time Bar for 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
Jenna Neumann*
Section 1226(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) requires federal detention of certain deportable noncitizens
when those noncitizens leave criminal custody. This section applies only to
noncitizens with a criminal record (“criminal noncitizens”). Under section
1226(c), the Attorney General must detain for the entire course of his or her
removal proceedings any noncitizen who has committed a qualifying offense
“when the alien is released” from criminal custody. Courts construe this
phrase in vastly different ways when determining whether a criminal noncitizen will be detained. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the
Fourth Circuit read “when the alien is released” to mean “any time after the
alien is released,” allowing the government to detain and deport criminal
noncitizens years or decades after their release from criminal custody. A majority of district courts as well as the First Circuit, however, have interpreted
the clause to mean “immediately upon the alien’s release.” Under this construction, immigration enforcement can detain a criminal noncitizen for deportation and detention only shortly after her release from criminal custody.
This Note argues that in light of recent legal and policy changes, the latter
interpretation of section 1226(c) offers the correct understanding of the statute. It further contends that a universal one-year time bar should be implemented for detentions occurring under section 1226(c) to respect due process
concerns.
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Introduction
Maria came to the United States in 1995 and married a United States
citizen in 1998, claiming lawful permanent resident status the following
year.1 Her husband abused her later in their marriage, but when she tried to
seek help in 2001, her husband told the police Maria had threatened him
with a butcher knife.2 The police arrested Maria and charged her with felony
assault.3 On the advice of her defense attorney, Maria pled guilty to the
charge in exchange for eighteen months of probation and one year in the
county jail, which was to be suspended so long as she served her probation
term.4 Maria accepted the plea bargain so she could return to care for her
children as soon as possible.5
Six years later, the police pulled Maria over for failing to completely stop
at a stop sign.6 When running her name through police records, the police
found her 2001 assault conviction.7 The police arrested and brought her to
the county jail, where Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers
then took her into custody.8 ICE deemed Maria deportable under two different sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and denied her
release on bond.9
Cases like Maria’s happen because of courts’ interpretations of five
words in section 1226(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)—“when the alien is released.”10 Courts construe
1. Maria Theresa Baldini-Potermin, Mandatory Detention: It’s Time to Return the Authority to Redetermine Custody to the Immigration Court, 86 Interpreter Releases 2909, 2914
(2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
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this provision in two distinct ways. Some, like the Fourth Circuit and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) read the clause to mean any time after
the alien is released.11 According to that construction, when a noncitizen
who committed a crime is released from custody, she could be subjected to
mandatory detention for removal proceedings days, months, or even years
after her release into the community.12 The First Circuit13 and a majority of
district courts,14 however, have interpreted the clause to mean immediately
upon the alien’s release.15
Section 1226(c) mandates federal detention, without the possibility of
bond, for criminal noncitizens when they are released from other custody.16
This section references only noncitizens with a criminal record.17 Section
1226(c) stems from the IIRIRA, which was enacted in 1996 to overhaul immigration law.18 The IIRIRA requires the Attorney General to detain noncitizens with previous criminal arrests and convictions who are deportable for
having committed certain offenses.19 During deportation proceedings, the
individual may be held without bond or the right to present her case to the
immigration judge for redetermination of custody status.20 This applies to
lawful permanent residents and to noncitizens deemed deportable for misdemeanor offenses that occurred years or even decades previous.21
The BIA’s interpretation of “when released” in In re Rojas indicates that
people like Maria could be subjected to mandatory detention for removal
proceedings because they had once committed a punishable offense, even if
they were released from criminal custody years prior. This interpretation
affords the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel generous
leeway to initiate removal proceedings against those arrested or convicted at
a delayed date.22 Delayed proceedings are administratively easier because
they eliminate the need for constant communication between local authorities and the DHS regarding the arrest or conviction of every noncitizen nationwide, while also ensuring and expediting the removal of noncitizens
with criminal convictions.23 Moreover, the Immigration and Naturalization
11. See Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec.
117, 120–24 (B.I.A. 2001) (interim decision); infra Section I.B.
12. Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 129 (Moscato, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (plurality opinion).
14. E.g., Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 535–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Baquera v. Longshore, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1262 (D. Colo. 2013); see also infra Section I.C.
15. Araujo-Cortes, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 542–43.
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
17. See id.
18. Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, The Mandatory Detention Dilemma: The Role of the Federal Courts in Tempering the Scope of the INA § 236(c), Immigr. Briefings, Jul. 2010, at 1, 1–2.
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (listing the offenses found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), and (D) as deportable offenses).
20. See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 1, at 2910.
21. See id.
22. See In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 127 (B.I.A. 2001) (interim decision).
23. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 12–13.
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Service (INS)24 preferred this arrangement because the INS could not detain
all noncitizens during their deportation proceedings due to limited space in
detention facilities.25 As a result, approximately 20 percent of noncitizens
absconded.26 Forgoing a temporal limitation on detaining criminal noncitizens after their release back into the community provided a way to address
this problem.27 Under this approach, however, someone who has been productively contributing to society for years after her release may be later detained and removed, causing upheaval for families and loved ones who are
left behind as well as imposing restraints on the noncitizen’s personal
liberties.28
This Note argues that interpreting section 1226(c) as immediately “after
an alien’s release” is the correct understanding of the statute and that courts
should read a one-year time bar into section 1226(c). Part I analyzes section
1226(c) and contends that the majority of district courts, as well as the First
Circuit, correctly interpret section 1226(c). Part II examines the recent legal
and policy changes curtailing mandatory detention and concludes that
“mandatory” detention may not be all that mandatory. Part III proposes a
one-year time bar on the ability to redetain an individual for deportation
without bond in order to balance the legitimate security concerns of the
statute with respect for personal liberties.
I. Interpreting the Words “When an Alien Is Released”
Courts’ differing interpretations of when an alien is released demonstrate the overarching confusion regarding the meaning of section 1226(c).
The BIA, as well as the Third and Fourth Circuits, read the phrase to mean
any time after the alien is released,29 while several district courts and the

24. ICE is an agency under the DHS created to take on the law enforcement functions of
its predecessor, the INS. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, History: Who Joined DHS,
https://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs [https://perma.cc/5QHE-N2ZZ] (last updated Sept. 15,
2015).
25. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 601, 620 (2010).
26. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (upholding the legality of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)).
27. Id. at 528.
28. See Cecilia Menjı́var & Leisy Abrego, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Legal Violence
in the Lives of Immigrants: How Immigration Enforcement Affects Families,
Schools, and Workplaces 2 (2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/12/MenjivarLegalViolenceReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/YCV5-8MBU]; Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Serv., Unlocking Liberty: A Way Forward for U.S. Immigration
Detention Policy 18 (2012), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKING
LIBERTY.pdf [http://perma.cc/G2CA-9RTU].
29. See Desrosiers v. Hendricks, 532 F. App’x 283, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2013); Sylvain v.
Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 379–80 (4th
Cir. 2012); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 120–24 (B.I.A. 2001) (interim decision).
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First Circuit interpret it to mean upon the alien’s release.30 This Part provides background on the debate over section 1226(c) by examining the relevant statute and the different courts’ analyses.
A. Statutory Context
By passing the IIRIRA, Congress significantly changed the process a
criminal noncitizen faces once detained.31 Section 1226(c) provides certain
conditions under which an immigration judge may detain a noncitizen and
deny bond. The provision states:
(c) Detention of criminal aliens
(1) Custody
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C) or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to a term of
imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, when the alien is released,
without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
(2) Release
The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1)
only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18
that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a
witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation
into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an
investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will
not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely
to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release
shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity
of the offense committed by the alien.32

This provision applies to a criminal noncitizen who has already served
out his or her sentence in a local jail or state prison and has subsequently

30. E.g., Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (plurality opinion); AraujoCortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Baquera v. Longshore, 948 F.
Supp. 2d 1258, 1262 (D. Colo. 2013).
31. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 2–3.
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
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been released.33 If the crime an individual committed reflects an inadmissible34 or deportable offense, the section then instructs the Attorney General
to detain the individual for deportation.35 Relevant deportable or inadmissible offenses referenced by section 1182(a)(2), section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) in this provision include crimes involving moral
turpitude (other than purely political offenses) or attempts or conspiracies
to commit such crimes, charges of prostitution, human trafficking, money
laundering, aggravated felonies, possession of controlled substances, and
firearms offenses.36 If the noncitizen committed one of these offenses, then
under section 1226(c)(1)(D), the Attorney General may take her into custody “when the alien is released” from other custody.37 The provision applies
only to a certain subset of crimes and noncitizens.38
B. The BIA’s Interpretation of the “When Released” Clause
The BIA’s opinion in In re Rojas provided a legal basis for detaining
criminal noncitizens at any point after their release into the community.39 In
that case, a New Hampshire state court had convicted Rojas—a lawful permanent resident—of an aggravated felony and sentenced him to prison.40
Rojas qualified for parole supervision in 2000 and was released from prison
the same year.41 The INS, however, took custody of Rojas two days after his
release.42
The court concluded that when a noncitizen who committed a crime
leaves custody, she may be subjected to mandatory detention by the INS
days, months, or even years after her release.43 No temporal limitation exists.44 Analyzing the objectives and policy of the statutory scheme to resolve
the issue, the court found that section 1226(c)’s predecessor provisions45
relating to the removal process placed no importance on the timing of when
33. See, e.g., Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute contemplates
mandatory detention following release from non-DHS custody for an offense specified in the
statute . . . .”).
34. Inadmissible noncitizens are those ineligible to apply for visas or admission into the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012).
36. Id. § 1182(a)(2); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), (D).
37. Id. § 1226(c)(1).
38. Id.
39. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 127 (B.I.A. 2001) (interim decision).
40. Id. at 118.
41. Id. at 119.
42. Id. at 118.
43. See id. at 127.
44. See id. at 124–25.
45. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991).
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a criminal noncitizen could be taken into custody.46 There was no “connection in the Act between the timing of an alien’s release from criminal incarceration, the assumption of custody over the alien by the Service, and the
applicability of any of the criminal charges of removability.”47 The court
therefore held that “the amendments made by the IIRIRA cover criminal
aliens regardless of when they were released from criminal confinement and
regardless of whether they had been living within the community for years
after their release.”48 The court interpreted the statute to allow for
mandatory detention any time after the alien’s release.49
The Third and Fourth Circuits have upheld the BIA’s reasoning.50 In
Hosh v. Lucero, the Fourth Circuit found the provision in section 1226(c)
ambiguous and held the BIA’s construction permissible.51 Hosh concerned
whether a deportable criminal noncitizen who was not immediately taken
into custody by the INS upon his release was exempt from section 1226(c)’s
mandatory detention provision and entitled to a bond hearing.52 The court
found the word “when” ambiguous because it can mean an “action or activity occurring ‘at the time that’ or ‘as soon as’ [an]other action has ceased or
begun.”53 Alternatively, it can “mean the temporally broader ‘at or during
the time that,’ ‘while,’ or ‘at any or every time that.’ ”54 The court therefore
found that no temporal limitation existed within the statute and denied
bond.55
C. An Alternative Interpretation: Araujo-Cortes
Not all courts agree with the BIA’s interpretation in In re Rojas.56 Many
district courts have interpreted section 1226(c) to be unambiguous.57
Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, a case from the Southern District of New York,
46. Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 122–23.
47. Id. at 122.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 127.
50. See Desrosiers v. Hendricks, 532 F. App’x 283, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2013); Sylvain v.
Attorney Gen., 714 F. 3d 150, 161(3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 379–80 (4th
Cir. 2012).
51. Hosh, 680 F.3d at 378.
52. Id. at 377.
53. Id. at 379 (quoting Waffi v. Loiselle, 527 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (E.D. Va. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. Id. at 380 (quoting When, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/when [http://perma.cc/R6PQ-APF8]).
55. Id. at 379–82, 384.
56. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Souza, 952 F. Supp. 2d 307, 316 n.6 (D. Mass. 2013); Baquera
v. Longshore, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1263 (D. Colo. 2013).
57. See Ortiz v. Holder, No. 2:11–CV–1146 DAK, 2012 WL 893154, at *3–4 (D. Utah
Mar. 14, 2012); Harris v. Lucero, No. 1:11–CV–692, 2012 WL 603949, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23,
2012), abrogated by Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012); Rianto v. Holder, No.
CV–11–0137–PHX–FJM, 2011 WL 3489613, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2011); Gonzalez v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:CV–10–0901, 2010 WL 2991396, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010);
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best represents this approach.58 There, ICE had arrested and detained
Araujo-Cortes, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, due to a
2009 conviction for the criminal possession of a weapon for which AraujoCortes had not been sentenced to a prison term.59
The court concluded that “Congress did not intend the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) to apply to individuals plucked out of the
communities they have reintegrated into.”60 ICE subjected Araujo-Cortes to
detention not upon his release in 2009, but five years after the fact.61 Looking expressly at the language of the statute, the court concluded that section
1226(c)(2) “places limits on when the government may release “alien[s] described in § 1226(c)(1). It does not provide for the arrest and detention of
an alien who is not in custody.”62 The court criticized the BIA’s interpretation, stating that if Congress meant to adopt the BIA’s interpretation of
“when released” to allow for the deportation of all criminal noncitizens regardless of their release from criminal custody, Congress could have explicitly done so by employing language such as, “after the alien is released” or
“regardless of when the alien is released.”63 Given that Congress did not
include this language, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to
allow criminal noncitizens to be detained and deported for convictions long
after they occurred.
The First Circuit adopted a similar analysis in Castañeda v. Souza.64 In
that case, two foreign nationals petitioned for writs of habeas corpus.65 Each
challenged his mandatory detention during removal proceedings and requested a bond hearing.66 The First Circuit considered in part whether Congress intended section 1226(c) to apply only to criminal noncitizens
detained immediately upon release or at a reasonable time afterward.67 After
examining Congress’s intent, a three judge plurality did “not believe Congress intended that the executive could fail to pick up an alien within a
reasonable time and then, despite that unexplained delay, deny that alien the
chance to seek bonded release notwithstanding that alien’s years of living
freely.”68 The plurality thus held that the two foreign nationals were not
taken into immigration custody “when [they were] released” from criminal
custody because they had been released from criminal custody years before
Bromfield v. Clark, No. C06-757RSM, 2007 WL 527511, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2007);
Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130–31 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
58. Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
59. Id. at 538.
60. Id. at 536.
61. Id. at 535.
62. Id. at 542.
63. Id. at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 36–43 (1st Cir. 2015) (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 18–19.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 36–43.
68. Id. at 42.
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their immigration custody even started.69 Even if the court did not articulate
a time limit between release and detention, the plurality acknowledged that
multiple years between release and detention was too long.70
Different courts have reached different interpretations of “when an alien
is released.” Accordingly, whether plaintiffs feel a sense of closure in their
understanding that they will not be detained depends on which court decides their case. Part II demonstrates that In re Rojas’s conclusion is untenable in light of policy and legal changes that place a temporal limit on
mandatory detention.
II. Progressing Toward a More Conservative Detention System
Courts are not beholden to the BIA’s interpretation of section 1226(c)
under administrative law principles or in light of recent policy and legal
changes. Section II.A argues that courts should not defer to the BIA’s interpretation of “when released” because, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,71 the results are illogical and unreasonable.
Section II.B.1 explains how the transition from Secure Communities (SComm), a deportation program that relied on a partnership between federal, state, and local law enforcement, to the new Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), replaces detention mandates with requests that an individual be
detained. Section II.B.2 discusses how, in recent months, courts have held
mandatory detention provisions unconstitutional.72 Section II.B.3 argues
that, given the lack of legislative history surrounding the passage of section
1226(c), the statute should be construed narrowly so as to not attribute due
process violations to Congress. Although these factors alone are not dispositive, when taken together, they reveal a trend toward a more moderate immigration system.
A. Under Chevron, Courts Are Not Bound by the BIA’s Interpretation
Courts should not defer to the BIA’s determination of “when released”
in In re Rojas because, under Chevron, it is unclear whether Congress intended to delegate the authority to interpret section 1226(c) to the Attorney
General or the BIA.73 Courts have applied Chevron in the immigration context because immigration cases generally concern a petition for review of an
agency decision—here, a BIA decision—in interpreting a statute.74 While
Chevron affords a deferential review of agency decisions, its analysis should
not apply. The BIA cannot even pass the Chevron “step zero” test, where
69. Id. at 19 (alteration in original).
70. See id. at 37–43.
71. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
72. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305
(D. Or. 2014).
73. See Gerard Savaresse, When Is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the Requirements of
Mandatory Detention, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 285, 322–23 (2013).
74. See, e.g, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
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courts must determine whether Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law.75 Even when courts do not
conduct an analysis under step zero, their interpretations have resulted in
illogical results where the word “release” is not afforded its ordinary
meaning.76
Chevron developed a two-step test to determine how much deference
courts should give to agency interpretations of statutes. The fundamental
inquiry is whether Congress left ambiguities in legislation for an agency to
resolve.77 The court must first determine whether it owes deference to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute under Chevron.78 To do so,
the court must analyze the plain language of the statute and apply the
“traditional tools of statutory construction”79 to determine if the intent of
Congress is clear. If Congress’s intent is clear, the court must recognize the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.80 If the intent of Congress is
not clear, however, courts proceed to the second step of Chevron. Under that
step, the court must determine if the agency’s interpretation of that statute is
reasonable.81 If it is, then the court must defer to the agency’s
interpretation.82
Although Chevron mandates a deferential inquiry, the analysis should
not even apply because the BIA cannot pass what is called a “step zero”
analysis. Under that inquiry, the court must determine whether Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law.83 The relevant inquiry is whether “Congress delegated authority to
the agency to provide interpretations of, or to enact rules pursuant to, the
statute at issue—interpretations or rules that carry with them ‘the force of
law.’ ”84 To answer this question, courts ask whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency in question and whether the agency is
exercising that delegated interpretive authority.85 The BIA’s interpretations
of mandatory detention provisions, specifically section 1226(c), should not
75. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
76. See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Hendricks, 532 F. App’x 283, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
that completing a probationary sentence can fulfill the “release” requirement under section
1226(c)); Sylvain v. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that a conditional
discharge can also fulfill the “release” requirement under § 1226(c)).
77. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
78. Id. at 843.
79. Id. at 843 n.9.
80. Id. at 842–43.
81. Id. at 843 (referring to a “permissible construction of the statute”).
82. Id. at 843–46.
83. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
84. See City of Arlington. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001)).
85. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
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be given Chevron deference because those interpretations do not pass step
zero.
Nothing demonstrates that Congress meant to delegate authority to the
BIA to decide detention questions.86 Notably, courts have not engaged in
step zero in the detention context, and so have failed to question whether
Congress intended to delegate its lawmaking authority regarding statutory
detention questions. The Supreme Court came closest to addressing this
question in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, which concerned an immigration deportation challenge.87 The Court deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of a crime
provision at issue, stating that the Attorney General had issued regulations
that “vested the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and authority
conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in the course of ‘considering
and determining cases before it.’ ”88 Congress vested interpretive authority in
the Attorney General,89 who then delegated such authority to the BIA.90
Since the transfer of interpretive power implicated the authority of an
agency, this delegation required Chevron deference.
It is not clear whether, by extension, courts should apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of ambiguity in detention provisions. Conferring authority on the Attorney General does not automatically resolve the
issue. The Attorney General serves as only one of the multiple agencies
vested with general lawmaking authority.91 Where multiple agencies have the
power to interpret a statute, deference to one agency’s decision is not necessarily warranted under Chevron.92 In detention cases, “Congress gave no
such similar indication that it contemplated the Attorney General’s adjudication of the scope of its detention power.”93 Moreover, nothing affirmative
exists to imply that Congress envisioned that the BIA would be answering
detention questions, especially provided its failure to recognize any mechanism for adjudication in the detention context.
Moreover, Congress may not have wanted the BIA to decide detention
questions for practical reasons. The “major questions” doctrine undermines
allowing the BIA to decide detention questions. Under that doctrine, courts
86.
absence
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) in Section I.A to see the
of any language referring to the BIA.
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418 (1999).
Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1)(1998)).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 425.
After the creation of the DHS, the wording of the INA changed:

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions,
and duties conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the
officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers . . . .

See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012).
92. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
93. Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 143, 178–79 (2015).
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may forgo deference to agency decisions that implicate questions of major
economic and political importance.94 As the Supreme Court explained, “we
must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”95 Since detention impinges
upon personal liberties, Congress likely would not have authorized an
agency to decide questions of such significance. Thus, deference might well
be inappropriate.96
Yet even accounting for these practical concerns, courts continue to apply the traditional two-step Chevron test.97 In the immigration context,
many federal courts have stopped at step one, finding the statute unambiguous and rejecting the BIA’s interpretation.98 Others have continued to step
two, deferring to the agency after finding the statutory provision ambiguous.99 “When released” cannot be reasonably construed as “any time after
release” under step two, however, because it produces irrational outcomes
when the word “release” is not understood by its usual meaning.100
Even if the “reasonableness” standard under step two is an extraordinarily lenient standard in practice,101 applied in the immigration context, it
leads to illogical results where the word “release” is not afforded its ordinary
meaning. In Sylvain v. Attorney General and Desrosiers v. Hendricks, the
Third Circuit deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of “released” in Matter of
Kotliar and Matter of West.102 Each Third Circuit case involved a lawful permanent resident who was not sentenced to incarceration for the offense that
later led to his mandatory detention.103 The petitioners argued it was impossible for them to have been “released” from criminal custody since they were
never incarcerated.104 In each case, “the Third Circuit rejected the petitioners’ arguments by deferring to the BIA’s interpretation that release from an
94. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
95. Id. at 133.
96. See Das, supra note 93, at 185.
97. Id. at 165–66.
98. See, e.g., Nabi v. Terry, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D.N.M. 2012); Valdez v. Terry,
874 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1274–76 (D.N.M. 2012); Khodr v. Adduci, 697 F. Supp. 2d 774, 778–80
(E.D. Mich. 2010).
99. See supra Part I for an explanation of the court’s rationale in such cases. See also
Desrosiers v. Hendricks, 532 F. App’x 283 (3d Cir. 2013) (deferring to In re West, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 1405 (B.I.A. 2000)); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 378–79 (4th Cir. 2012) (deferring to
In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (B.I.A. 2001) (interim decision)).
100. See Savaresse, supra note 73, at 322–29.
101. See Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 Ind. L.J. 605, 612 (2014)
(quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009)) (“[I]f Congress has
directly spoken to an issue [at step one] then any agency interpretation contradicting what
Congress has said would be unreasonable [at step two].”).
102. See Desrosiers, 532 F. App’x 283 (deferring to In re West, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405 (B.I.A.
2000)); Sylvain v. Attorney Gen., 714 F. 3d 150, 156–61 (3d Cir. 2013) (deferring to In re West,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1405 (B.I.A. 2000), and In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (B.I.A. 2007)).
103. Desrosiers, 532 F. App’x at 284; Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 152–53.
104. Desrosiers, 532 F. App’x at 285; Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 153.
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initial arrest prior to conviction constituted a release under the statute at
Chevron step-two with little to no analysis under Chevron step one.”105
Under this analysis, those who were never incarcerated still could be considered “released” from custody. Perhaps defendants should not pass Chevron
step two if it allows the BIA to conceptualize a “release” when no physical
release occurred. Rather, detention upon immediate release offers a more
rational interpretation. It appropriately tracks the underlying purpose and
intent of the statute, ensuring community safety while also balancing respect
for the noncitizen’s personal liberties.106
B. Recent Policy and Legal Changes Reinforce the Araujo-Cortes
Conclusion
Section 1226(c) should be read to avoid harsh results, consistent with
current policy and legal changes. Recent modifications indicate the need for
an immigration system that prioritizes respecting individual liberties over
privileging detention. A closer look at the legislative history behind the passage of section 1226(c) only serves to reinforce this current trend.
1. The Demise of the Secure Communities Program and the
Rise of the Priority Enforcement Program
Changes in federal detention policies indicate a shift away from
mandatory detention. The move away from S-Comm to PEP as an enforcement mechanism for mandatory detention structures detention notices as
“requests.”107 Such language confirms the government’s intention to temporally limit the mandatory detention of noncitizens. PEP’s more moderate
approach discourages redetention of criminal noncitizens long after their
release.
Recent policy changes in the procedure governing ICE holds also weigh
against concluding that there is no temporal limitation on “when released.”
When the DHS learns of a foreign national in state or federal custody, it may
place an “ICE hold” on the individual.108 The hold notifies the facility not to
105. Das, supra note 93, at 165–66.
106. See id. at 290.
107. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Form I-247D, Immigration Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action (referring to notice of detention as a “request”), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/I-247D.PDF [http://perma.cc/
595Z-K4SN]; Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Form I-247N, Request for Voluntary Notification of Suspected Priority Alien (same), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/402/
include/I-247N.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DHL-8F56]; see also Priority Enforcement Program:
Overview, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/pep [http://perma.cc/
F2ZZ-C56Y]; Priority Enforcement Program: How Is PEP Different from Secure Communities?,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/pep [http://perma.cc/F2ZZC56Y] (“Under PEP . . . . rather than issue a detainer, ICE will instead request notification . . .
of when an individual is to be released.” (emphasis added)).
108. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 17–18 for a discussion on the mechanics of the
process.
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release the person but instead to transfer him or her to federal custody at the
end of the jail term.109 According to the applicable regulations,110 upon the
DHS’s request, as communicated via a detainer form,111 a criminal justice
agency “shall maintain custody of the alien, for a period not to exceed 48
hours . . . in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.”112
In theory, the state or local law enforcement agency should release the individual if ICE does not detain her after forty-eight hours; in practice, if ICE
has not responded, law enforcement agencies continue to detain the individual beyond the forty-eight-hour timespan.113
To strengthen immigration enforcement, ICE administered S-Comm
beginning in 2008 and codified the system of using an ICE hold in order to
facilitate the detention process.114 Using fingerprint data gathered by state
and local law enforcement officials, S-Comm employed an automatic procedure wherein any time an individual was arrested and jailed, ICE automatically ran his or her fingerprints through its electronic immigration
database.115 The program devolved immigration enforcement to local law
enforcement, while also maintaining discretionary control to arrest at the
federal level.116
Although the Obama Administration announced the end of S-Comm in
November 2014, it soon thereafter replaced S-Comm with PEP.117 Under
that program, once an arrest occurs at the state or local level for a criminal
violation, local authorities submit the individual’s fingerprints to both the
FBI and to ICE.118 As outlined in Secretary Jeh Johnson’s 2014 memorandum defining the program, PEP prioritizes enforcement and possible detention under a descending hierarchy of three categories: Priority One addresses
threats to national security, border security, and public safety; Priority Two
deals with misdemeanants and new immigration violators; and Priority
Three covers other immigration violations.119
109. Id.
110. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011).
111. Priority Enforcement Program: Overview, supra note 107.
112. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
113. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 17.
114. See Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure
Communities, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1259, 1260, 1265–71 (2015).
115. Id. at 1260.
116. Id. at 1271.
117. Id. at 1265.
118. Priority Enforcement Program: Overview, supra note 107; see also Memorandum from
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al. 1, 3 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter PEP Memo
from Jeh Johnson], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure
_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/RYT5-BFL7].
119. PEP Memo from Jeh Johnson, supra note 118, at 3–4. Under PEP, ICE may not
transfer a noncitizen from nonfederal to ICE custody unless the individual meets “either the
higher of PEP’s priority levels or a high-level official’s determination that the noncitizen
pose[s] a national security risk.” Stumpf, supra note 114, at 1283.
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The shift from S-Comm to PEP marked a noteworthy change in
mandatory detention law, since fewer criminal noncitizens qualify as “priorities” under PEP and thus are not subjected to mandatory detention.120
Although S-Comm intended to prioritize the most dangerous criminal
noncitizens, it ultimately processed everyone who appeared to be a noncitizen.121 In contrast, PEP marks a turn away from enforcement by defining
its categories to exclude large numbers of noncitizens.122
Secretary Johnson’s PEP memorandum limited mandatory detention.
Under PEP, immigration detainers are no longer mandatory orders for
nonfederal authorities to hold noncitizens until ICE takes custody.123 Secretary Johnson changed the detainer’s obligatory language by directing ICE to
replace detention mandates with “requests” that the state or local criminal
authorities notify ICE of an individual’s pending release.124 With PEP, ICE
may only issue detainers under limited circumstances, primarily when ICE
indicates the individual’s status is an enforcement priority and when probable cause exists.125 ICE can no longer seek transfer of individuals with civil
immigration offenses or those charged with, but not yet convicted of, criminal offenses.126 Rather, ICE may seek transfer only under the limited auspices listed as Priority One, Two, and Three enforcement concerns explicitly
enumerated by PEP. These directives reduce the likelihood that a noncitizen
will be placed directly into an ICE hold.
PEP ushered in changes in the detainer form’s language that further
corroborate the intention to temporally limit mandatory detention. Before
PEP, the DHS used detainer form I-247 (Immigration Detainer—Notice of
Action) to allow criminal justice agencies to take custody of a noncitizen.127
Under PEP, the DHS no longer uses Form I-247, but rather employs two
new forms: Form I-247N, Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of

120. See Stumpf, supra note 114, at 1281 (describing the PEP hierarchy, which includes
strict guidelines for prioritizing noncitizens for removal).
121. Id. at 1269 (“Secure Communities took advantage of [FBI and DHS] databases in a
different way and used them to check all arrestees across the nation to identify removable
noncitizens.”).
122. Senator Jeff Sessions, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration and the Nat’l Interest,
News Release: Judiciary Senators Decry New DHS Plan to Free Criminal Aliens: ‘Will Endanger the American People’ (July 8, 2015), http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2015/7/judiciary-senators-decry-new-dhs-plan-to-free-criminal-aliens-will-endanger-the-a
merican-people [http://perma.cc/JBB6-F25B].
123. Stumpf, supra note 114, at 1283 (“Secretary Johnson overtly demoted the detainer
from a federal mandate to a request . . . .”).
124. Priority Enforcement Program: How Is PEP Different from Secure Communities?, supra
note 107.
125. PEP Memo from Jeh Johnson, supra note 118.
126. See id.; Priority Enforcement Program: How is PEP Different from Secure Communities?, supra note 107.
127. See Priority Enforcement Program: Overview, supra note 107.
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Suspected Priority Alien, and Form I-247D, Immigration Detainer—Request for Voluntary Action.128 Form I-247N “requests” the receiving law enforcement agency to notify ICE of a suspected priority individual’s pending
removal at least 48 hours prior to release.129 ICE must identify the enforcement priority of the individual.130 The local law enforcement agency may
not hold the individual beyond the point at which she is authorized for
release.131 Likewise, Form I-247D “requests” that a local law enforcement
agency’s custody of the individual not exceed forty-eight hours beyond the
time originally scheduled for release. Again, ICE must also identify the priority placement of the individual.132 When framed as a “request,” detention
becomes an option, not a command.
While local law enforcement agencies will likely comply with “requests”
from the federal government, PEP’s softer approach still discourages the
move to redetain criminal noncitizens long after their release. Although PEP
may appear similar to S-Comm, it actually applies section 1226(c) to a narrower group of people than S-Comm.133 Reading a narrower scope into section 1226(c), as the DHS did with the PEP program, would make
immigration enforcement more rational and consistent.
2. Constitutional Challenges and the
Nonobligatory Nature of Mandatory Detention
Recent court decisions likewise show a shift in the law toward less draconian detention policies. A Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure challenge to the constitutionality of ICE holds has been upheld,134 calling into
question whether ICE holds can actually be considered mandatory. If the
request that state or local officials hold an individual an additional fortyeight hours rests on tenuous constitutional grounds, it is unclear how it may
be constitutional or reasonable to detain an individual years after release
from federal custody.
A recent Oregon district court case, Miranda-Olivares v. Clackmas
County, contests the constitutionality of ICE holds.135 In this case, Miranda128. Id.
129. DHS Form I-247N, supra note 107 (“IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU:
Provide notice as early as practicable (at least 48 hours, if possible) before the subject is released from your custody to allow DHS an opportunity to determine whether there is probable
cause to conclude that he or she is a removable alien.”).
130. See Priority Enforcement Program: Overview, supra note 107.
131. Id.
132. DHS Form I-247D, supra note 107 (“IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU:
Serve a copy of this form on the subject and maintain custody of him/her for a period NOT
TO EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the time when he/she would otherwise have been released
from your custody to allow DHS to assume custody.” (emphasis omitted)).
133. See Priority Enforcement Program: How is PEP Different from Secure Communities?,
supra note 107.
134. E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305
(D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
135. Id.
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Olivares, a foreign national, was jailed in 2012 on a domestic violence
charge.136 The next day, ICE sent a form requesting that the county officials
detain her for up to forty-eight hours, in order to allow the agency to investigate her immigration status.137 She pled guilty to one charge of contempt
of court138 and was sentenced to an additional two days in jail.139 Given that
Miranda-Olivares had credit for time served, she would have been promptly
released if not for the ICE request.140 Instead, county officials continued to
hold her for an additional nineteen hours until ICE took her into DHS custody the following day.141
The court reached two key conclusions pertaining to ICE holds. First,
the court determined that detainers were not mandatory.142 Interpreting the
detainer regulation as mandatory would come close to violating the Tenth
Amendment under the anti-commandeering principle.143 Congress’s instruction that local law enforcement agencies adopt and implement federal
detainers inappropriately imposed a federal regulatory scheme upon state
and local governments.144 Second, the court held that the existence of the
detainer did not provide probable cause to detain Miranda-Olivares, but
rather violated her Fourth Amendment rights.145 The court concluded that
her detention ended after her arraignment.146 Her continued stay in jail was
therefore not a continuation of her initial arrest, but rather a new seizure,
empty of the necessary “initial finding of probable cause for violating state
law.”147 Continuing her detention based on the ICE detainer qualified as a
new “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody.”148
Miranda-Olivares appears to impose an unspoken temporal restraint,
serving as a point of caution for those considering complying with an ICE
136. See id. at *1.
137. Id. at *1–2.
138. Id. at *2–3. Restraining orders under the Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 107.700 et seq,
are enforced through contempt proceedings under ORS Chapter 33. State ex rel. Hathaway v.
Hart, 708 P.2d 1137, 1137, 1139 (1985).
139. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *4–8. The court relied in part upon the Third Circuit’s decision in Galarza v.
Szalczyk, holding that detainers are merely requests. Id. at *6–7 (citing Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745
F.3d 634, 640, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[N]o U.S. Court of Appeals has ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests.”)).
143. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *6. The anti-commandeering principle prohibits the federal government from “commandeering” state governments, by compelling state
governments to adopt and enforce federal regulatory programs. See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992), remanded to 978 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision).
144. See Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *6.
145. Id. at *8–12.
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. at *9.
148. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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detainer.149 State and local officials may be more inclined to release individuals and disregard detainers in order to avoid potential constitutional
claims.150 Indeed, after Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, many local
law enforcement agencies changed their policies to limit or even eliminate
compliance with ICE holds.151 When there is a time lapse between release
and detention, detention is too attenuated. The arrest is not immediate.152 If
it is problematic to detain someone like Miranda-Olivares, who had not
even left the confines of the jail in which she stayed, it would be similarly
unconstitutional to confine someone years after being released from his or
her jail cell.
3. The Lack of Legislative History of Section 1226(c)
The legislative history of section 1226(c) provides more support for
reading in a temporal limit on the phrase “when released.” The recent policy
and legal developments tending toward a temporal restriction on the timing
question have only just begun to harmonize with the legislative history.
Given that the legislative history surrounding the passage of section
1226(c) does not speak to the timing question,153 the statute must be construed narrowly to mitigate the harmful effects of detention without parole.154 Congress’s silence on the question obscures whether Congress
actually considered the issue of temporal limits.155 Some courts have claimed
that Congress’s silence denotes the intention to treat those detained immediately upon release and those detained long after release from criminal custody the same.156 Reading in such nonexistent statutory distinctions,
however, places unspoken words in Congress’s mouth.157
149. See 2014 WL 1414305.
150. See Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., Is My Client Subject to Mandatory Detention: How Advances in ICE Hold Policies Will Reduce Those Subject to Mandatory
Detention 1 (2014), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/mandatory_detention_ice_hold_
policy_handout.pdf [http://perma.cc/4KB7-ZR5Q].
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Savaresse, supra note 73, at 325–26.
154. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885,
894 (2004) (“Arguments about policy and legislative history—the full panoply of interpretive
techniques—could narrow the statute’s coverage, but never broaden it. If the plain text were
expansive but the legislative history suggested a narrower meaning, the judge would favor the
latter view.”). See infra Section III.B for a discussion of the harmful effects of detention.
155. Savaresse, supra note 73, at 325–27.
156. E.g., Sylvain v. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d
375 (4th Cir. 2012). The Third and Fourth Circuits held that, because Section 1226(c) does not
provide a consequence for the failure to immediately detain a noncitizen offender, Congress
meant to treat individuals detained long after their release no differently from those detained
immediately upon release.
157. Savaresse, supra note 73, at 327.
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By contrast, courts may read in a one-year time bar because such a reading does not attribute the creation of potential Fourth Amendment violations to Congress.158 Mandatory detention significantly restricts the free
movement of people and infringes upon personal privacy,159 implicating
constitutional questions that Congress likely would have hoped to avoid.160
Allowing law enforcement officials additional time to detain criminal noncitizens who pose a severe threat to society does not create the same constitutional concerns.
A more conservative reading evades the danger of attributing unwanted
and unanticipated changes and constitutional violations to Congress.161
Congress had the necessary tools to state that ICE could detain noncitizens
released back into the community if it so desired, but it chose not to employ
them.162 Other options existed since, “If Congress wished to permit the Attorney General to take custody of criminal aliens at any time after being
released from criminal confinement, it could have done so using the phrase
‘at any time after the alien is released.’ ”163 Due in part to the serious liberty
restrictions and associated due process claims that result from the DHS’s
interpretation of section 1226(c), this statute should be construed narrowly.164 When such grave concerns are implicated, the absence of a specific
distinction does not license later lawmakers and judges to interpret these
words in a way they feel best.165
Even if legislative history does not address the timing question, Congress
has allowed courts to read in temporal limits for other provisions. The
changes Congress made to previous mandatory detention provisions suggest
its acquiescence to the majority of the federal district courts which have
imposed a timing restriction.166 For example, several district courts have understood a similar provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to apply to noncitizens taken into custody “within a reasonable time
158. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL
1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014), for a discussion of constitutional concerns.
159. See Menjı́var & Abrego, supra note 28.
160. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1447, 1462–63 (2010), for a summary of the presumption that Congress acts in
accordance with the Constitution, that is, the presumption of constitutionality.
161. See Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305.
162. See Lisa Schultz Bressman et al., The Regulatory State 239–40 (2d ed. 2013).
Congress was explicit elsewhere and could have been explicit here, too, if its intention was
truly to detain criminal noncitizens years after release from criminal custody.
163. Khodr v. Adduci, 697 F. Supp. 2d 774, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
164. See Price, supra note 154, at 894; see also infra Section III.B.
165. See Savaresse, supra note 73, at 326–27.
166. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 135–37 (B.I.A. 2001) (Rosenberg, J., dissenting);
Savaresse, supra note 73, at 313–14 (explaining that the Rojas dissenters would interpret Congress’s imposition of a reasonable time requirement in the AEDPA as supportive of a similar
imposition of temporal restrictions in § 1226(c)); see also supra Part I.
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after release from incarceration.”167 Congress’s silence and inaction in response to this narrative in federal district courts demonstrates its acquiescence to this interpretation.168
In the legislative history that does exist, legislators express a desire for
the statute to mitigate potential public safety concerns caused by criminal
noncitizens.169 This further corroborates the purpose of the statute—namely,
to reduce the serious threat criminal noncitizens pose to public safety.170 A
1995 Senate Report cites the strong connection between illegal entry and
criminal activity, stating that those who enter “illegally have no legitimate
sponsors and are prohibited from holding jobs . . . [C]riminal conduct may
be the only way to survive.”171 The report noted that of the estimated
450,000 noncitizens in the criminal justice system, only 19,000 such individuals were deported in 1993.172 In addition, according to the report, it would
take an estimated twenty-three years to deport all such individuals if this
rate continued.173 Although the Senate Report suggested numerous reasons
for the low deportation rate, it focused on the release of noncitizens on bond
as a predominant cause. The Committee recommended that Congress “consider requiring that all aggravated felons be detained pending deportation.
Such a step may be necessary because of the high rate of no-shows for those
criminal aliens released on bond.”174
Yet several factors undercut this logic. First, attributing such a measured
response to the public safety concern to Congress places idealism above realism. Congress passed the IIRIRA and other controversial immigration-reform measures by attaching them to larger omnibus bills, the passage of
which remained virtually certain.175 This leaves the question of whether the
IIRIRA enjoyed broad public support unanswered. Second, the public safety
argument loses some of its vigor given that the individuals ICE seeks to
remove are often productive members of society.176 Criminal noncitizens
generally pose a negligible threat to public safety, as many fall under this
167. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 135 (citing Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339, 342–43
(N.D. Ga. 1996)).
168. See Bressman, supra note 162, at 239–40.
169. See S. Rep. No. 104–48, at 1 (1995) (suggesting that Congress meant 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) to curb the threat posed by criminal noncitizens).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 32.
175. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in
Immigration Stories 343, 348–54 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
176. More than half of the immigrants removed in 2009 and 2010 had no criminal histories, and among those who did, almost 20 percent committed only traffic-related offenses. See
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Annual Report, June 2011, at tbls. 2–4, http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/VD8T-ZHZ
7].
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category only for having committed an immigration offense.177 Substantial
evidence demonstrating that criminal noncitizens are disproportionately violent repeat offenders does not exist. Detaining criminal noncitizens contributes nothing substantive to the underlying purpose of section 1226(c),
thus lending more support for a temporal limit on the phrase “when
released.”178
In light of the more tolerant changes addressed in Part II, allowing for
the detention of criminal noncitizens to continue without a temporal limit
would create profound inconsistencies within immigration enforcement.
Unreasonable interpretations should not be advocated with the pretext of
Congress’s approval. Unfortunately, the one court that has continued to apply Chevron did not abide by this principle.179 Additionally, if, as in Miranda-Olivares,180 even a forty-eight-hour detention period may be
unreasonable, detaining an individual months or years after she has reintegrated into the community should not be reasonable. Rather, these policy
changes indicate a move toward a more lenient and transparent detention
system respectful of individual civil liberties. Section 1226(c) should be interpreted consistently with these changes.
III. Proposing a One-Year Time Bar
This Note proposes a one-year time bar after which ICE may no longer
detain a noncitizen subsequent to her release under section 1226(c). Section
III.A explains that although the Third and Ninth Circuits have adopted approaches that intend to place durational limits on section 1226(c), these
courts do not apply the correct temporal analysis. Section III.B examines the
associated social costs of detaining an individual who has reintegrated into
society. Part III concludes by discussing how a one-year time bar would
mitigate the social costs while also staying true to the object and purpose
behind section 1226(c).
A. One-Year Time Bar for Mandatory Detention
The phrase “when an alien is released” poses a statutory dilemma for
courts across the country. To provide a solution, the Ninth and Third Circuits adopted approaches intended to place durational limits on section
1226(c). These courts address the question of how long a noncitizen may be
detained without a bond hearing while awaiting deportation. The Ninth Circuit created a six-month maximum to detain the noncitizen without bond
until she can be deported.181 The Third Circuit imposed a reasonableness
requirement to determine how long one should be detained.182 Nonetheless,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See

supra, notes 169–174 and accompanying text.
Sylvain v. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 156–61 (3d Cir. 2013).
No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2013).
Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2011).
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both approaches fall short of addressing the underlying question: whether
the noncitizen should initially be brought into custody and detained after
her release at all.
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez v. Robbins concluded that detention
under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing is limited to six months.183 In
that case, a class of noncitizens had been detained longer than six months.184
The detainees argued that denying them bond hearings conducted by a neutral arbiter violated the due process clause.185 The district court entered a
preliminary injunction granting each detainee an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.186 On appeal by the government, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The court “conclude[d] that, to
avoid constitutional concerns, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)’s mandatory language
must be construed ‘to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation [for
detention], the application of which is subject to federal-court review.’ ”187
Detention without bond should be only as long as necessary to effectuate
removal. Such detention becomes “prolonged at six months.”188
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s bright-line six-month rule, the Third
Circuit adopted a case-by-case approach.189 In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the Third Circuit stated:
Reasonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-dependent inquiry requiring an
assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case. That being said,
we note that the reasonableness of any given detention pursuant to
§ 1226(c) is a function of whether it is necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the statute.190

A case-by-case approach provides an analysis, consistent with, and considerate of, the government’s limited resources.191 As stated by the Sixth Circuit in
Ly v. Hansen, which also embraced the reasonableness requirement, adopting a universal, six-month rule across all courts may burden administrative
resources and judges.192 Hearing schedules and other procedural requirements would often make it difficult, if not impossible, to meet the sixmonth rule.193 This summer in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
183. See Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1144.
184. Id. at 1130–31.
185. See id. at 1132.
186. Id. at 1130–31.
187. Id. at 1138 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001)).
188. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See also Michelle Firmacion, Note, Protecting
Immigrants from Prolonged Pre-Removal Detention: When “It Depends” is No Longer Reasonable, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 601, 607 (2015).
189. See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit
in Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267–68 (6th Cir. 2003), used the same approach.
190. 656 F.3d at 234.
191. See Firmacion, supra note 188, at 616–17.
192. See 351 F.3d at 271–73.
193. Ly, 351 F.3d at 271–73.
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will rule on whether section 1226(c) requires a bond hearing if detention
lasts for six months or more, officially ending this debate in the lower
courts.194
Although both of these approaches offer notable improvements in interpreting section 1226(c), each falls short of addressing the true underlying
issue. Neither the Ninth nor the Third Circuit speaks to whether the noncitizen should have even been brought back into custody initially. The question is not how long the individual may be detained, but rather whether the
individual should be detained at all. If the object and purpose of section
1226(c) is to detain those who pose a security threat in order to protect
society, it would only be rational to detain those who indeed pose such a
threat. Since those detained under section 1226(c) are often ripped away
from productive societal pursuits and family members,195 the DHS should
take extreme care.
There should be a time bar after which the government may no longer
detain the individual once released from a conviction that did not result in a
prison sentence. If the DHS does not move with all reasonable speed to
detain the individual, the individual should be secure and justified in believing that detention no longer remains a possibility. Implementing a time bar
ensures compliance with constitutional concerns, eliminating the possibility
that such individuals are held arbitrarily and unreasonably without the necessary opportunity to vindicate their claim.196 The statutory bar should be
set at one year; this time frame would alleviate the individual’s constant
concern of potential detention, while also allowing DHS personnel the requisite time to detain those who may pose a security threat or flee to evade
capture by authorities.197 More than a year would not be necessary for the
DHS. Statistics demonstrate that the agency effectively apprehends criminal
noncitizens deemed to be enforcement priorities under PEP.198 A standard
with less than a year, however, might impede the DHS’s ability to detain
those who pose a security risk. Timelines with strict deadlines are at times
necessary, especially when the lives of individuals are at stake.199
194. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (Mem.); Brief for Respondents at
34–37, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (Mem.) (No. 15-1204).
195. See Menjı́var & Abrego, supra note 28, at 2–3.
196. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305
(D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
197. See Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., Limit Removal Based on Long Ago Conduct
1–2, http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ijn-statute-of-limitations-factsheet.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ESY2-QUAH] (arguing that a statute of limitations should be applied to deportation
decisions); see also S. Rep. No. 104–48, at 12 (1995) (lamenting the weak laws designed to
prevent criminal aliens from committing more crimes or fleeing before deportation).
198. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics [http://perma.cc/3DF2-52BF].
199. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (noting the use of “stringent
time limitations” on the deprivation of liberty as a strong procedural protection); Lindsey
Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 115, 115–19 (2008)
(discussing the “fundamental arbitrariness” of limitations periods in the context of recent
attempts to add exceptions to limitation periods).
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Other criminal law statutes support this time bar. Statutes for misdemeanor offenses also have a one-year statute of limitations in many states.200
Given the increasing similarity between immigration and criminal law,201 the
application of the one-year period in the immigration context appears even
more appropriate. Here, a statute with a shorter time frame is appropriate
when an individual’s autonomy remains precariously resting in the hands of
the government.202 Any longer interval would unnecessarily compromise the
dignity of human lives.203 The one-year approach strikes a reasonable costbenefit balance between the personal liberty interests of the potential detainee and the security concerns of the nation.
B. Costs for the Social Contract
Personal, social, and economic costs of detaining a noncitizen years after
release also serve to further reinforce the irrationality of interpreting “when
released” to mean “any time after release from custody.” Mandatory detention imposes significant costs on the detainee. Adhering to a one-year time
bar serves to mitigate the attendant social costs while also adhering to the
underlying purpose of mandatory detention under section 1226(c).
Detention carries damaging long-term consequences for a detainee’s
mental and physical health, negatively impacting his or her ability to integrate into society upon release.204 These consequences last long after release.
The public then bears the costs associated with those granted relief and permitted to stay in the United States after their removal cases.205 The costs
borne by the public include funding mental and physical health and related
services, as well as the services employed in helping the individual reintegrate into society.206
Postponed detention also imposes costs on the detainee’s family members, levying societal expenses in the process. The families of detainees suffer
both financially and emotionally, and some are forced to seek public assistance.207 Oftentimes, family members lose their homes and businesses in the
200. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-3-2 (1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500.050 (LexisNexis
2014); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-106 (LexisNexis 2015).
201. The likeness exists primarily in the harshness of the punishment—detention and
imprisonment—which many have considered to be synonymous. See Savaresse, supra note 73,
at 329.
202. See Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 197.
203. See Alina Das et al., N.Y.U. Immigrant Rights Clinic, Practice Advisory:
Government Retreats from Matter of Saysana’s Interpretation of Mandatory Detention Statute 11–13 (last updated Apr. 2010) http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/Saysana.pdf [http://perma.cc/8CUX-HZY6] (arguing that
mandatory detention violates equal protection and due process rights).
204. See Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Serv., supra note 28, at 3.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation & American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Pennsylvania at 6–7, Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221
(3d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1113).
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process.208 The trade-off and relatively small number of dangerous criminal
noncitizens actually removed through the process calls into question the
true viability of the legal standard now in place.209 The effects of detaining
even one former criminal noncitizen touches many other lives in the process. A one-year time bar would curb these effects because it would allow
those who left criminal custody and continued to rebuild their families and
lives to continue cultivating positive relationships and contributing to
society.
Moreover, it becomes difficult for noncitizens to integrate into and contribute to the broader population when they live with the constant fear of
deportation. The fear created by immigration enforcement fosters an environment for legal violence, punitive immigration laws, increased enforcement, and the disapproval of immigrants, which further harms
integration.210 Many individuals become afraid to leave their homes, to take
their children to school because of potential immigration raids, and to speak
out against workplace exploitation.211 Social inclusion and economic mobility of immigrant communities would benefit all Americans.212 When immigrants do not live in fear, they have the potential to enact positive social
change and to strengthen communities and neighborhoods across the
country.213
These considerations only serve to reinforce the Araujo-Cortes line of
cases and the necessity of a one-year time bar. When factoring in the associated costs, the combination of individual, societal, and economic repercussions reveals the harmful nature of mandatory detention, especially for
nonviolent detainees whose lives are disrupted. Detaining individuals years
after they work to assimilate cripples communities and prevents individuals
from remaining productive members of society.214 Adhering to a one-year
time bar serves to mitigate personal and social costs while also staying true
to the underlying purpose of the mandatory detention statute.
Conclusion
Noncitizens should not have to live in continual fear of detention after
their criminal cases are closed. This Note argues that the Araujo-Cortes
court’s interpretation of section 1226(c) offers the correct understanding of
the statute by reading in a temporal limit to the phrase “when an alien is
released.” Recent policy and legal changes track the shift away from
mandatory detention to a system that places greater emphasis on discretion.
Imposing a temporal limit on detaining a noncitizen who has been released
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 6.
See U.S. Department of Homeland Sec., supra note 176.
See Menjı́var & Abrego, supra note 28, at 2, 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See supra notes 204–213 and accompanying text.
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into the community after leaving criminal custody offers a more responsible
social policy that harmonizes personal liberties with national security interests, striking a judicious balance among the competing concerns. In order to
achieve this balance, a more concrete component should be added to the
Araujo-Cortes analysis to institute a universal one-year time bar for pursuing
mandatory detention under section 1226(c).

